Cybersecurity and the Pandemic

TLDR: In the face of a pandemic, we were not ready as a society from a cybersecurity standpoint

March 13, 2020, was my last full day in the office. The coronavirus was threatening to continue spreading like wildfire and, like many governmental organizations in the United States, parts of the federal government began to take action. That Friday, I was sent home with my work laptop in tow and told to get settled to work from home; how long, no one really knew. In the days and weeks that followed, we all began trying to figure out how to operate under this, "new normal."

In organizations that rely on daily interaction to conduct meetings and just generally check on the welfare of their employees, it can be difficult to transition. They must find new ways to navigate through the daily schedule. We found many ways to interact with each other, starting with Zoom, and then finally falling into a Department of Defense-approved system, Commercial Virtual Remote (CVR) Environment. With this new way of operating, there were some struggles.

As we began to utilize Zoom, murmurs began to arise about the security of the platform. Schools were being hijacked by pranksters hopping into rooms and disrupting classes. Additionally, it came to surface that data from Zoom was actually being routed through China; a serious concern for us in the federal government. The Department of Defense quickly put a kibosh on the use of Zoom for "official use" and quickly opened up the CVR platform; essentially, a Microsoft Teams environment. It was a trying time for us and many more organizations, I imagine, went through the same type of scenario. Thus, it begs to ask the question, were we ready?

The Zoom platform is pretty amazing. The videoconferencing capabilities it provides is excellent and allowed us to have everybody in the same virtual room at the same time to conduct our weekly staff meetings. I even utilized it to keep a "virtual office" open for anyone who might need to reach me and wanted to do it as close to a personal interaction as possible. However, it was clear, from all of the news that came out as the pandemic began to perpetuate, that a platform like this was not ready for mainstream usage.

As Zoom use exploded, many people jumped into the water, head first, without a life jacket. There were security features, such as room passwords and waiting rooms, but many people did not use them. This left them vulnerable to the hijackings experienced by the schools. People believed that, without the meeting ID, there was no risk. However, a program called zWarDial was developed by researchers that could guess roughly 100 correct meeting IDs per hour. And, with no passwords to protect them, anyone could join in on the conversation.

The problem with moving to a platform like Zoom in an off-the-cuff, spontaneous manner is that we are just not ready. Too many organizations and individuals have put cybersecurity on the back burner for too long. And, in a time of need, like we saw as the pandemic kicked off, the door is left ajar for malicious actors to enter and wreak havoc. In the case of Zoom, they quickly moved to educate users on the security features; but, this should have been done ahead of time, with planning.

Organizations and individuals need a contingency plan in place. What are you going to do if your daily operations or daily lives are upended? If that contingency plan includes some form of information technology, there needs to be a plan in place on how to use it effectively and securely. The Zoom case is a prime example of why this needs to happen. Furthermore, it is not just the organizations and individuals who need to prepare, but also the developers of the technology.

Concerning is the idea that Zoom was pushing data through China without anyone’s knowledge. They only admitted it after it was identified that encryption keys between the United States and Canada were being routed through China. Granted, Zoom admitted fault in its geo-fencing process to keep data in the regions it was being transmitted, but this still provides evidence that some technology developers just are not ready for mainstream usage within organizations.

We need to do more as a society to increase our knowledge of cyber threats and malicious intents. Not only do organizations have a dire need to secure their systems, but personal devices need to be considered as well. In today’s world of data breaches and espionage, it can only take one small incident to create a much larger problem. We must do more to educate everyone on best practices for securing data and devices.

Electronic Logging Devices: An Interesting Cybercriminal Target

TLDR: Unchecked cybersecurity requirements leave the commercial motor vehicle industry vulnerable to attack

Photo: Pexels.com

Greg Grisolano, a writer or Land Line, wrote a post regarding electronic logging devices (ELDs) and an FBI bulletin regarding their security. If you are like me and do not know what an ELD is, let me give you a quick background. An ELD is a device that records engine activity in a vehicle. The U.S. Department of Transportation, through the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, mandates that commercial motor vehicle drivers who are required to log hours must use an ELD. Essentially, it is an electronic log of a driver's on and off-duty record. Simple enough, right? So, what concern does the FBI have with security?

The ELDs allow connectivity via cellular, Bluetooth, and satellite communications, depending on the model being used. These devices connect into the electronic control module (ECM) of the vehicle to track things like vehicle identification, hours on the road, how many miles have been driven, and the vehicle's location. If you have ever taken your car to the dealership for a diagnostic evaluation or, perhaps, you have used a system like Verizon's HUM, then your vehicle's ECM has most likely been used at one point in time. 

According to the FBI, many of these ELDs have gone through a self-certification process, not an industry-standard certification. This means the manufacturer of the device has given its own devices a clean bill of health. What the FBI has discovered is that most of these self-certified devices do not follow any cybersecurity standards to prevent attacks or mitigate vulnerabilities. This leaves these devices open to the threat of a cyberattack. So, why would a cybercriminal want to attack an ELD on a truck hauling goods from Walmart's distribution center in Bethlehem, PA, to a store in, say, Omaha, NE?

An ELD (Photo: PeopleNet)

Some of the ELDs the FBI tested showed they provided more advanced options than their intended use. The intention is to simply log information. However, some of the self-certified devices actually provide the ability for the device to send commands to the vehicle's engine. Thinking like a malicious actor, how amazing would it be to have your name on the marquis on the dark web when you bring the trucking community to a screeching halt by shutting down all vehicles utilizing a compromised device? It may sound far-fetched, but it is a real possibility.

The biggest concern, however, concerns the connectivity to the outside world. From a cybersecurity standpoint, this is a huge vulnerability. An attacker could, in theory, target a vehicle utilizing the wireless, Bluetooth, or satellite communication channel on the ELD. Once inside the vehicle’s system, the attacker could then work to gain access to additional networks or systems. These could include enterprise-wide systems such as vehicle tracking; customer databases; personal information for drivers, employees, and customers; or even financial data. In the eyes of the FBI, the door is wide open for a large-scale event. So, how did ELDs become so vulnerable in the first place?

When the DOT and FMCSA mandated the use of these devices, they did nothing to require standards with regards to cybersecurity or quality assurance. Thus, there was no baseline for vendors to follow in order to certify their devices. Rather, they simply made sure they achieved a performance standard, logging all of the required information, and then sold them to commercial motor vehicle organizations to implement. This opens many proverbial doors for would-be attackers.

The FBI alert is a warning to those who use these devices. They urge users to reach out to the vendors to see what is being done to enhance the security of the ELDs. Interestingly, the DOT released cybersecurity best practices for these devices in May 2020, but they appear to just guidelines for the manufacturers to follow. It does not appear that there is any requirement for them to do so.

It is interesting, in our ever-connected world, the doors we can leave open to intruders. We are adding so many devices to our “Internet of Things” each day and, in doing so, only increase the attack surface on society. From a cybersecurity standpoint, we need to do better and enforcing strict requirements and testing to seek out vulnerabilities, fix them, and shut the door on would-be criminals. Our desire to have information at our fingertips, at a moment's notice, in an automated fashion continues to drive our need to ensure such data and information is secured; not just when called out by the FBI but from the very beginning.

Controls and Benchmarks: Necessary Evils

TLDR: Controls and benchmarks, while appearing to be cumbersome to some, are necessary evils in today's IT environment.

Figure 1 - CIS Controls

Benchmark, as it relates to computer systems, is defined as, "a standardized problem or test that serves as a basis for evaluation or comparison." In the world of information technology, there are various benchmarks available. You can test your office computer to see if it can efficiently run various administrative programs. Or, perhaps, you would like to see where your newest gaming computer ranks among other testers. The most important benchmarks, in my opinion, are those developed by the Center for Internet Security (CIS).The overall mission of CIS is to make the information technology world better for everyone; governments, schools, municipalities, businesses, individuals, etc. They do this by providing controls and benchmarks. The easiest way to visualize these is control = policy and benchmark = evaluation.

20 controls have been developed by CIS based on real-world attacks and defenses which have worked effectively against those attacks. You can look at controls as after-action items that have feasible solutions. They are broken down into three categories: basic, foundational, and organizational (Figure 1).

An example of a control is the basic control of Inventory and Control of Hardware Assets; the first control listed. Under this control, the organization should do several things regarding devices. Among these are: utilize an active discovery tool (identify security function), address unauthorized assets (respond security function), and deploy port-level access control (protect security function). The CIS provides guidance on what these controls are for but leaves it up to the organization to determine how to properly implement them.

Figure 2 - An Ubuntu Benchmark Setp

Benchmarks are not controls; however, they are closely related. While the controls provide guidance on what an organization should be doing to protect its information technology assets, the benchmark provides direction on how to secure assets. For instance, CIS provides a benchmark for securing systems running Ubuntu Linux 18.04 LTS (Figure 2). Following through the benchmark allows the organization to implement know best practices for assets. Again, these are based on information gathered from attacks and what has effectively worked well against such attacks.

Controls and benchmarks are necessary evils in today's information technology-driven world. An organization utilizing controls and benchmarks, best practices to secure information systems, stands a much better chance of thwarting off an attack than one which does not. Controls are the mechanisms by which an organization can implement policies to protect assets and the benchmarks are there to make sure those assets are secure.

Personal Health Data, the Dark Web, and Protecting Information

Credit: https://www.managedhealthcareexecutive.com

TLDR: Personal health information is a valuable target for the dark web. Organizations must do more to protect it.

During class this week, the topic of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, commonly referred to simply as HIPAA, came up. The primary topic of the discussion was about the vulnerabilities to organizations using HIPAA information and the penalties for violating the Act. I have had discussions about HIPAA in previous cybersecurity classes, but I never really delved into the "why factor" surrounding patient records until now. It is quite intriguing to know why an individual's records are so important to a hacker.

In the article, "Research Reveals Why Hacked Patient Records Are So Valuable," by Marianne McGee, she discusses this very topic. This article introduced new terms for me: fullz and identity kits. A fullz, slang in the dark web world, is a term used to describe an individual's full health history. This can be intricate records of health issues and also include such things as the pharmacy a person utilizes. These can be purchased on the dark web for as little as $20 and then turned into identity kits.

Credit: https://www.freepik.com/

An identity kit is a combination of lots of information farmed about an individual off of various venues and then combined with health data. These venues can be from websites, phone calls, and any other method an attacker can use to get information. A key part of completing these kits is social engineering. Perhaps an attacker has your medical data and contact information but needs just a few more details to put everything together. You might start seeing emails or receiving phone calls asking you to verify data that the attacker needs to put the pieces of the puzzle together. Once complete, attackers can then sell the identity kits on the dark web for thousands of dollars to other entities who can then use those kits to still the individual's identity. Scary thought, right?

An even scarier thought is that, according to Carol Amick, 70% of organizations are not compliant with HIPAA. Now, this does not necessarily mean that 70% of organizations are vulnerable to attacks, but that is a large number of organizations handling patient medical information who do not meet compliance to safeguard such information. An even scarier thought: it may only take one organization to cause havoc for millions of people.

In 2014 and 2015, Anthem Health was the target of a spear-fishing campaign. This attack resulted in the compromise of personal information for 80 million individuals. An attack of this magnitude as the result of a spear-fishing campaign shows that organizations, especially those with highly valuable personal information, must do more to combat vulnerabilities. These types of attacks will only get more sophisticated and look more authentic, so organizations must step up their defenses and train employees to be cognizant of organizational policies in place to prevent such compromises.

The Anthem Health case was considered a sophisticated attack. The attackers appeared to have full access to systems they should not have. The likely culprits, in this case, could have been malware or a response to login credentials. They were able to gain access to the organization's databases and run queries from some time in December 2014 until January 29, 2015, when the last noted query was performed. In reality, the Anthem Health breach was not actually a HIPAA violation since no actual medical records were stolen. Rather, full names, birthdates, social security numbers, and employment information, among others, were the target of the attackers; some of the needs for identification kits.

Anthem Health is just one case of an organization being compromised through malicious activities. As we move forward storing and transmitting more and more personal information across the Internet, it is imperative that organizations take stronger initiatives to safeguard this highly valuable data from falling into the hands of dark web constituents. Leadership at all levels of an organization dealing with such information must do everything in its power to protect individuals who have entrusted them to safely handle their personal information. This could be accomplished through stricter adherence to HIPAA standards, revamped training initiative for employees, and, where Anthem failed, encrypting such data to further protect it. Furthermore, IT departments can leverage strict spam and traffic filters to prevent malicious links from entering the organization and, if they do, prevent any damage by highly limiting traffic to suspected websites.

Will we ever eradicate malicious attacks? It is highly unlikely. However, through proper education of employees and strict enforcement of acceptable use policies within organizations, we can certainly make it harder. Organizations that work with highly sensitive information, regardless of who it might affect, must take steps to prevent breaches like the massive Anthem Health example from occurring. They only way they can is to make it harder for employees to unknowingly open the door to attackers and constantly monitor their systems for any sign of malicious activity. Anthem Health went for nearly a month before employees noticed something strange. That was nearly a month too long for something like this to have been occurring.

A Non-Rambling Discussion on Threat Modeling Approaches (CYBR 650, Blog #1)

TLDR: Threat modeling comes in a variety of approaches. Knowing what you are trying to protect can help steer you to a more appropriate method.

Unless you are vehemently against technology, you have used it at some point in your life. Perhaps you have a cell phone, a laptop computer, or, for most of us, have used a debit or credit card. Our lives, the organizations we work for, and the businesses we patronize all thrive on technology. With the explosion of technology to help make life easier for civilization, it is also imperative for us to continually remember there are those out there who want to inflict harm. This is where threat modeling can help an organization protect itself and, to some degree, individuals as well.

In his book, Threat Modeling: Designing for Security, Adam Shostack provides three primary approaches to threat modeling: asset, attacker, and software. Each of these three methods focuses on different areas of threats and how to mitigate, eliminate, transfer, or accept the associated risks. Now, it is certainly not feasible that individuals would perform construct a threat model for each new technology they add to their pocket or household, but some of these things should come to mind. Organizations, on the other hand, must perform threat modeling for each asset and system added to the inventory. While each model has its pros and cons, it may really come down to a mixture of all three approaches. Let’s look at each to see why that might be the case.

Image credit: BizNews

Asset-centric threat modeling means putting emphasis on what you value and then looking at the vulnerabilities associated with those assets. From a personal perspective, this could be looking at what threats you have to accessing your bank account information online. Can your password be stolen and used to long into the banking application? From an organizational perspective, this could be protecting a database full of client records. What threats exists to this data and how can we further protect it? The focus here is on what one values.

Image credit: FitDay

Attacker-centric threat modeling focuses on what an attacker might do. Instead of looking at assets to protect, this approach looks at the various tactics and techniques an attacker might use to attempt to gain access to an asset. If you think like a burglar when looking to protect your home, you might install a second lock on the door or find better ways to secure your windows. On the organizational side, this can include things like focusing on a list of usernames and passwords for critical systems. Perhaps you want to check these credentials to make sure they cannot be easily cracked. Again, the thought here is to consider, “what would an attacker do?”

Image credit: InformationAge

The last threat modeling approach Shostack discusses is that of a software-centric approach. This approach is focused on dealing with software and systems being deployed within an organization. On the personal side, you can think of this as installing software on your laptop or even your smartphone. You certainly do not want to install anything which would let someone have access to your personal information. Likewise, organizations need to use this approach to look for holes which may allow attackers to gain access to their assets. If software is being deployed within the organization, are there concerns which may open up vulnerabilities on the computers or networks critical to the organization’s operations? These are things to consider when using a software-centric approach to threat modeling.

Image credit: DZone

Another threat modeling approach is STRIDE. STRIDE stands for spoofing identity, tampering with data, repudiation, information disclosure, denial of service, and elevation of privilege. This approach really pertains mostly to information systems but can be thought of with other threats as well. Shevchenko points out that this approach was invented in 1999 and adopted by Microsoft in 2002. Knowing that this applies primarily to information systems (IS) helps to see why Microsoft adopted this approach to threat modeling.

Spoofing an identity, in the IS world, concerns the authentication of systems or the authenticity of packets on a network. Someone can steal your credentials, log into a computer system, and pretend to be you while they perform malicious actions. Similarly, a hacker can spoof the identity of a packet, launching a man-in-the-middle attack, and pretend to be the sender or receiver of information. In the physical world, this would be similar to someone posing as a repair person or a delivery driver to gain access to a building.

Tampering with data concerns the integrity of data within a system. This can be data at rest on a computer disk or memory as well as data moving through a network. A student finding their grades stored on the school’s computer network and modifying them to earn an A in all of their classes would be an example of tampering with data at rest. A hacker taking a packet of information, modifying it to change values, and sending it onto the destination is an example of modifying moving data. 

Repudiation pertains to validity of actions. If repudiation is present, one can deny the actions were taken on their part. For instance, if a critical file was modified or deleted, who was responsible for it? The violation of non-repudiation means there is no way to confirm or deny that a specific entity was responsible for accomplishing actions. From a physical standpoint, this would be like a sign-in sheet to a class. If you signed in, it is generally accepted you were there. In the absence of a sign-in sheet, it becomes more difficult to determine if you did or did not attend the class. This is something commonly handled through the use of log files to document all actions and who took those actions.

Information disclosure concerns information getting into the hands of someone it is not supposed to. For an IS, this could include incorrect folder permissions allowing someone to modify financial records in the accounting division when they should not have access to such documents. In the physical world, someone gaining access to an unlocked filing cabinet and pulling personnel records when they do not have a need to know falls into the same category. Information which should be safeguarded is compromised due to a lapse in confidentiality.

When talking about denial of service, this typically means that an IS is unavailable when needed. You have likely heard of DDoS attacks where attackers create an army of zombie computers to bring a web server down. They bombard the server with so many requests that the server cannot keep up and eventually access is denied to users who need to use it. The bombardment of bogus requests causes any relevant requests to be ignored by the system. You could liken this to a need to reach a 911 operator when thousands of pranksters are calling in to keep the phone lines busy. You have a legitimate need but cannot get assistance because all lines are busy.

The last part of STRIDE is elevation of privilege, which concerns someone being able to accomplish a task they are not authorized to perform. With IS systems, an example would be a regular workstation user being able to install software as an administrator. Their permissions should be set to prevent this, but they may be able to gain access and do this. An easy example of elevation of privilege lies in the Linux operating system. Normally, a logged in user should not be able to perform administrative tasks. However, if the user is in the sudoer group, they can issue a command with sudo to elevate their permissions to that of the root user and perform a litany of tasks.

Threat modeling comes in various approaches. Shostack discusses the three primary approaches: asset, attack, and software. He provides good information on when these are best suited for use but ultimately makes the case for a software-centric approach as the best. Additionally, we have the STRIDE approach to threat modeling which appears to be a solid model with which to evaluate IS assets to ensure threats and vulnerabilities are accounted for. Whichever approach you use, it is always wise to think outside of the box to cover all possibilities and determine if the threat should be mitigated, eliminated, transferred, or accepted.

Blog Analysis and Summary - The Final Chapter

The past 12 weeks has been a wonderful learning experience. I felt like I knew a bit about security, but I certainly did not know the management aspect of it. This blog was my way to bring the business lingo down to Earth on a level most of us could understand and relate to.

Much of the information I found was scattered across the Internet. I found articles on CNET, The Washington Post, ABC News, and Business Week. I really wanted to gather as much information on the topics as possible and not utilize the same resources over and over again. There was a lot of good information I garnered from LifeHacker. The information has been out there, I just never knew what to look for. Having this blog and the topics week-to-week helped keep me focused.

I started my blog by looking at personal security. In the corporate world, securing data is a major part of doing business today. It is no different in our personal lives. We need to make sure we are taking the appropriate precautions to ensure we protect ourselves, just as we would do as managers within a corporation.

Next, I looked at liability and security. It is good to know that we have some form of protection if our data is compromised. On the personal level, this could be with credit monitoring services and such. On the corporate level, liability can be deflected to other agencies, if services are contracted and the other agency is liable via the contract.

Over the next few weeks, I took a look at life and how it related to security awareness, risk management, and the costs associated with protecting valuable assets. Just as a corporation must have security policies in place and evaluate risk, we need to do that in our own lives too. We need to consider the costs associated with decisions. Perhaps a child downloads a program which installs a virus and wreaks havoc on your home computer. This same type of behavior can happen in the business world too!

Lastly, I looked into securing wireless networks. In the business world, leaving networks unsecured is the easiest way to lose valuable information. The same hold true in your own home. Understanding the need to secure networks is critical for protecting data from being compromised. We all have some degree of information that, if stolen from someone on the outside, could be detrimental to our own personal lives. Businesses are no different.

As you can see, I used this term to relate the business ideas to those of my personal life. It will be some time before I am able to utilize the information security principles we learned, so relating them to something I am doing now helped clarify most of the topics. I am hopeful that, by bringing these concepts down to Earth, I will remember the valuable information in this class. Hopefully it will help someone else who is new to the concepts of information security! It sure helped me!

The Chief Information Security Officer, Big Shoes to Fill!

This week, we have been looking at personnel and security. One of our assignments was to write a job description for the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO). We have been following a newly appointed CISO throughout the class, so I thought it would be easy. It was a bit more difficult than I thought. Additionally, there is a LOT the CISO is responsible for, based on the job descriptions I looked at for guidance.

I looked mainly at CareerBuilder in my quest for more information and found 31 jobs advertised for CISO. Looking at the job descriptions, it should be no surprise that the CISO is responsible for the information security and risk management programs. Another resonating topic noticed while looking at the job descriptions was communication and supervision. This should not be a surprise, since we are looking at a top-level officer in the organization. I did find something surprising, however.

I was surprised to see the experience and education requirements for a CISO in most of the listings. The listing for LRS.com did not list education as a requirement, but did ask for a minimum of seven years of experience. Another listing, a CISO job for Teledyne Technologies, indicated a minimum of five years' experience. I based my assignment on those factors, but then I began to think about it. Is that really enough experience?

After more consideration, I would change my requirements on the job description to require at least 10 years in the IT field and, preferably, a majority of those in management. If you think about the role of the CISO, it is an important asset in the organization. The CISO is the person ultimately responsible for everything related to the IT systems, their security, and the security and privacy of data. When a breach occurs, it is likely going to be the CISO answering the questions and trying to figure out just what happened. Is this where you want inexperience?

Don't get me wrong. There are a lot of individuals who excel on the job and move up the ranks very, very quickly. Perhaps these organizations are looking for those top performing, quick moving individuals. My concern, especially if I was hiring a top-level manager, is that less than 10 years just might not be enough to learn the skills necessary to head the IT operations. Am I wrong? Perhaps. Would I be elated to receive the job with just five years' experience? You bet!

Referenced Sites

http://www.careerbuilder.com/jobs/keyword/ciso